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INTRODUCTION 
The formalization of Shari’a law has been the subject of wide­ranging debate in 
Indonesia, also internationally. This is because this idea has significant implications, 
politically and socially, not only for Muslims, but also for other followers of other 
religions who live in Indonesia. Although the majority of Indonesians are Muslims, 
Shari’a law has not been implemented formally in many regions in Indonesia. However, 
since the fall of President Soeharto and the New Order in 1998, Indonesia has 
transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a democracy and undergone 
decentralization. Since that time, local governments have used their authority to create 
regional religious regulations (shari’a bylaws) that regulate religious norms (Crouch, 
2009: 53). Many regional authorities and proponents of Shari’a bylaws used the 
Reformasi era to formalise Shari’a Islam at the state level. 
It is important to note that 78 shari’a bylaws have already been ratified by 
regional authorities. And more than 52 cities and regencies have applied these 
regulations at the regional level. This does not include draft or proposed legislation 
(raperda) or regent (Bupati) edicts, but does include the implementing regulations 
(qanun) in Aceh (R. Bush, 2008: 176). In general, these shari’a bylaws are concerned 
with three broad sets of issues: firstly, public order and social problems such as 
prostitution, consumption of alcohol and gambling. Secondly, religious skills and 
obligations, such as reading the Qur’an, paying zakat (alms or religious tax), and 
attending Friday prayers. Thirdly, religious symbolism, such as the wearing of Muslim 
clothing. (Salim, 2007: 126).  As Robin Bush writes, these shari’a bylaws attract 
significant attention from politicians, public figures, and intellectuals. This is because 
they raise a number of issues, including constitutional issues, discrimination (many of 
non Muslim felt threatened about shari’a bylaws), and governance (Bush, 2008: 175).  
The implementation of shari’a bylaws in Indonesia remains hotly contested. 
Some analysts argue that the enactment of shari’a bylaws reflects the fact that 
the majority of the Indonesian population is Muslim. However, others rebut this 
argument by pointing to the fact that Indonesia is not religious state, but a neutral state 
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which embraces many religious and cultures. Hence, government must protect and 
promote the rights of all its citizens and prevent discrimination. This article will 
examine the implementation of shari’a bylaws and their implications for religious 
minorities. Specifically, the following two questions will guide the argument of this 
paper: Is there any relations between democratization process and regional autonomy 
with the emergence of shari’a bylaws? How did religious minorities experience living 
under shari’a bylaws? In this paper, I will argue that shari’a bylaws have a negative 
impact on religious minorities in Indonesia. This paper consists of three parts. The first 
part examines the background of the emergence of shari’a bylaws. The second part will 
assess impact of shari’a bylaws on religious minorities’ rights. The third part will 
provide some suggestions on how to protect the rights of religious minorities. 
The background of the emergence of shari’a bylaws 
The process of democratization and regional autonomy which has taken place 
since the fall of the Soeharto regime has had positive and negative effects for Indonesia. 
One the one hand, the fall of Soeharto opened many opportunities for Indonesias to 
reform its political system to be more democratic. The event also rebalanced the power 
of the central government, which often treated regions as a government branch with no 
real authority. On the one hand, regulating decentralization through regional autonomy 
made the government more effective, efficient, and democratic. On the other hand, the 
creation and implementation of ‘Islamic Shari’a’ regional bylaws (Perda Syariah Islam) 
in many regions has been one of the 'negative effects' in the country which 
constitutionally declares itself as a religiously neutral state. This can be seen as an 
example of Islamic radical groups in Indonesia using democratic processes for an 
undemocratic purpose. 
In this respect, the regional religious regulations or shari’a bylaws actually 
emerged as a response to the regional autonomy law which was passed in 1999. Under 
this new regulation, local governments at the district level have authority to issue their 
own regulations. And the central government cannot intervene in local administration 
(Assyukanie, 2007). In fact, regional autonomy may succeed if can achieve two 
outcomes. Firstly, its implementation is followed seriously by improving the 
government’s bureaucracy. This is important to emphasize government services. 
Secondly, regional autonomy should create a governance finance that is oriented for 
people needs (Mulia, 2006: 23). Therefore, the increase in local autonomy must be 
coupled with democratization. This is important as a protection against the misuse the 
laws. Hence, people should be involved in the choosing of leaders and creating of 
policies. (Erb et al., 2005: 11) 
The enactment of the Decentralized Law in January 2001 represents a 
fundamental change in the relationship between and position of the central and local 
governments. But there are many weaknesses in its implementation. This is because the 
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law itself does not make clear how it should be implemented, leaving the relationship 
between central government and the regions ambiguous. Besides that, the 
Decentralization Law was labeled as contradictory, inadequate, and flawed (Crouch, 
2009: 55­56). Another weakness was the central government only provided for 
relatively few checks and balances relevant to the passing of shari’a bylaws. The 
enormous power which was given by the central government to local authorities has 
gone too far, leaving room for the creation of unimportant laws. Ironically, some of the 
regulations from regions are about religious matters which are actually still under 
control of central government. Due to the laziness of the central government to properly 
address this issue, these laws continue to operate (Crouch, 2009: 56).  
Responding to this issue, Michael Buehler points out that the increasing number 
of the shari’a bylaws is not just an indication of a conservative movement within the 
Indonesian Muslim community. This trend also reveals a change in the pattern of power 
accumulation and political corruption in Indonesian local politics (Buehler, 2008: 256). 
Indeed, as stated by Robin Bush, political leaders have been known to issue shari’a 
bylaws as a means of establishing their ‘Islamic’ credentials among their constituents 
(Bush, 2008: 188). Many of local political leaders tend to use the autonomy laws to 
strengthen their position by pandering to the Muslim majority. By demonstrating 
support for Islam, although it only symbolic, Muslim voters will be easily convinced 
that these leaders will favor Islamic interests.  
The emergence of shari’a bylaws in many Indonesian regions can also be seen as 
a new form of the shari’a Islam movement in Indonesia. This kind of movement 
emerged after the failure of the formalization of Shari’a Islam in national level. In 2002, 
the struggle of the implementation of Shari’a Islam at the central level has experienced a 
considerable setback. During deliberations on the process of amending the 1945 
constitution, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) rejected a proposal to insert 
the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution. The Jakarta Charter is an old constitutional 
amendment which recognised the obligation of Muslims to implement the shari’a in the 
country. The main factor behind this failure was a lack of supporters from mainstream 
political parties. There were only two small Islamic parties (the United Development 
Party and the Crescent Star Party) supported the proposal. In contrast, the nationalist 
parties in parliament and major Islamic organizations such as Nahdhatul Ulama’ (NU) 
and Muhammadiyah opposed idea (Assyaukanie, 2007). As a result, there is little 
prospect Shariah Islam could ever be formalised at the state level.  
The lack of support from other parties in parliament and Islamic organizations 
toward the notion of the enforcement of Shari’a law closely correlates with the 
distinctive nature of Indonesian Islam. Although the majority of the Indonesian 
population is Muslim, the Islamic parties only won a small percentage of the vote and 
accordingly represent a vocal minority only. For example, in 1999 national election, 
  2543 
both Islamic parties (the National Awakening Party and the National Mandate Party) 
and Islamist parties (the United Development Party, the Justice Party, and the Crescent 
and Star Party) only took 38 % of the vote. While, in 2004 the Islamic and Islamist vote 
again was 38 % (Bush, 2008: 182). The nationalist vote which is represented by the 
Democrat Party, Golkar Party and PDI­P Party, was the winner of the above national 
elections. It reminds us about the debate between the Islamic­oriented politicians and 
the leading kebangsaan (nationalist) groups during the formative era in Indonesia. At 
that time, the nationalist groups won the debate and Pancasila (Five Principles) then 
became state ideology (Eliraz, 2004: 78­79). Indeed, Pancasila (Five Principles) clearly 
respects all six dominant religions in Indonesia and gives equal rights to all Indonesian 
people.  
 
It is important to note that though the struggle of the formalization of shari’a 
Islam in national level ended in failure, the proponents of Shari’a Islam still carry on 
with their cause. In fact, they use local (provincial and district) parliaments, along with 
the introduction of autonomy packages and direct elections as the strategic way to 
formalize shari’a Islam. This has resulted in the enactment of shari’a bylaws (Perda 
syari’ah) in dozens of provinces and districts throughout Indonesia (Hasan, 2009: 40). 
Some national magazines in Indonesia such as Gatra and Tempo reported that the 
supporters of shari’a are pursuing a strategy of controlling districts before spreading 
shari’a to provincial and national levels. This strategy is described as “from village to 
city” and promoting shari’a through the slow lane (Hara, 2010: 47­48). Clearly, the 
struggle to formalize shari’a Islam remains alive. 
Moreover, the implementation of shari’a Islam in Aceh has encouraged other 
regions in Indonesia to follow this success. After the central government allowed Aceh 
to implement shari’a through a special autonomy law, other regions began to imitate 
Aceh by introducing regional regulations (perda), decrees (keputusan), instructions 
(instruksi), and circulars (surat edaran). And all of these laws contained Islamic 
injunctions (Salim, 2007: 126). In this regard, it is widely known that Aceh has been the 
pivotal inspiration and pioneer of the implementation of the shari’a bylaws in Indonesia. 
Advocates of shari’a sought to imitate Aceh’s example and insisted that the central 
government give them the same opportunity (Hasan, 2009:43). Although the social, 
political and historical background of Aceh in implementing shari’a bylaws is certainly 
different from other regions, advocates of shari’a Islam thought that they deserved to 
have the same rights as Aceh. 
 
 
 
  2544 
The Implications of Shari’a Bylaws for Religious Minorities  
It has been asserted by the proponents of shari’a bylaws that because of the 
majority of Indonesians are Muslims, they have the right to implement shari’a rules. 
They also contend that this demographic majority gives socio­cultural and political 
legitimacy to the implementation of Islamic principles as the basis of the state. Another 
reason for the demand of the implementation shari’a law is the contribution of 
Indonesian Muslims to the struggle against Dutch colonial power. Although there are 
many concerns about discriminations against minority groups in regions where shari’a 
has been introduced, they claim that shari’a is not harmful to minority groups 
(Tanthowi, 2009: 22­23). In addition, the proponents of shari’a bylaws also argue that 
the formalizing of shari’a Islam has produced positive impacts, including increased 
security, increased charitable contributions, donations and gifts, and improved levels of 
religious piety (Kamil, 2009: 135). 
However, as Moeslim Abdurrahman has said (Abdurrahman, 2001), when a 
shari’a bylaw is imposed, women, non­Muslim, and the poor will become the first 
victims of this regulation. This is because they have to follow a rigid interpretation of 
religious tenets which do not favor women and non­Muslims. The proponents of shari’a 
bylaws mostly favor a patriarchal perspective, placing Muslims as the first priority, and 
ignoring the existence of non­Muslims. Indeed, as Salim wrote (2008: 19), this implies 
that Muslims’ interests must be prioritized over the interests of other religious groups. 
As a result, the willingness of religious majority to impose the shari’a bylaws on all 
Indonesians will negatively affect the rights of religious minorities.  
The claim that Muslims have played the most important role in the struggle 
against colonial powers also leaves out the role of non­Muslim fighters that is not 
insignificant (Tanthowi, 2009: 23). And historical accounts of Indonesia’s independence 
also clearly acknowledge the contribution of all citizens. Actually, the tyranny of the 
majority over the minority is common phenomenon that often occurs in many regions in 
the world. Thus, democracy and tolerance were proposed to reduce and avoid this 
negative phenomenon. 
Furthermore, it should be underlined that some aspects of the shari’a bylaws 
contravene Indonesia’s obligations to protect the right to religious freedom. For 
example, The instruction of the Major of Padang 451.422/Binsos-III/2005 on the 
Obligation to Wear the Jilbab and Islamic Dress (for Muslims) and Suggested Attire 
(for Non Muslims) is certainly shows that the laws discriminate against vulnerable 
groups (Crouch, 2009: 81­82). Although Fauzi Bahar (the Major of Padang) often stated 
in many occasions that this bylaw does not apply to non­Muslims, anecdotal evidence 
shows that that non­Muslims students are also required to wear the jilbab (veil/female 
head covering). If non­Muslim students want to ignore this regulation, they are not 
allowed to attend class (Romli, 2008). As a consequence, a Christian student such as 
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Fransiska Silalahi, had to wear a veil for three years at school (Kamil, 2009: 135). This 
type of situation would clearly subject non­Muslims in Padang to social­psychological 
pressure. 
Discrimination against religious minorities not only occurs in Padang, but also 
in other regions which implement shari’a bylaws. Research on “The implementation of 
Shari’a Islam in regional autonomy era: its implications toward civil rights, women 
rights, and non­Muslim rights” that was conducted by CRCS (Center for the Study of 
Religion and Culture) UIN Jakarta (Kamil et al., 2007: 135) provides a useful insight 
into the reach and impact of shari’ah bylaws. CRCS studied six regions where shari’a 
bylaws caused discrimination toward religious minorities. For example, many non­
Muslim women were forced to wear Muslim female dress every Friday. Teachers and 
students at certain SMU (high schools) were also required to wear the veil. If they 
refused, their parents were required to declare their children as non­Muslims.  
Research by the Wahid Institute also states that non­Muslim women in Padang 
(West Sumatra) and Bulukumba (South Sulawesi) are obliged to wear veil after the 
implementation of shari’a bylaws. One of non­Muslim students reported that she felt 
stressed wearing veil. She thinks that she lives in the community which hates her. This 
is because most of the people have forced her to obey the regulations that contradict 
with her religious belief. Besides that, her Christians friends have also accused her of 
converting to Islam because of her decision to wear Muslim female dress (Wahid, 2009: 
140). Hence, one of the Christian leaders in Padang stated that the enactment of Shari’a 
bylaws had caused a serious psychological problem for non­Muslim students.   
Discrimination against religious minorities has also occurred in Aceh, 
particularly after the implementation of sections of 4 and 5 of Provincial Regulations 
5/2000 which regulate standards of dress to all people who live in Aceh, including non­
Muslims and tourists. There are many Western women wearing Muslim veils around 
Banda Aceh. The obligation to wear Muslim female dress was also applied to a Chinese 
woman working at BCA (secular bank) (Kamil, 2009: 135).  
Perda No. 5/2003: use of the headscarf for Muslim women in Bulukumba 
(South Sulawesi) takes a different approach. Non­Muslims in this area have been told to 
put on a headscarf at certain events, even though they are not subject of this shari’a 
bylaw. One of the respondents of research that was conducted by Rohaiza Ahmad Asi 
(2007: 8­12) witnessed a situation where outsiders entering Muslim villages were told to 
put on the headscarf. Relating to this situation, representatives from local community in 
Bulukumba stated that shari’a bylaws have already breed intolerance.  
The above examples clearly show that shari’a bylaws that are applied to 
minorities violate of religious liberties. Besides that, the regulations also lack a spirit to 
protect diversity of people’s belief in Indonesia. Unfortunately, discrimination toward 
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religious minorities continues because even strong non­religious parties frequently use 
shari’a bylaws for their religious purposes. As a result, it can be difficult for religious 
minority groups to find the appropriate agencies which can help them to resist the 
regulations which disadvantage them (Salim, 2008: 19­20). In effect, shari’a bylaws not 
only ignore legal pluralism, but also ignore the fact that Indonesia is a multi­faith 
community. It is therefore no surprise that the rights of other religious groups are not 
respected by shari’a bylaws (Salim, 2008: 5). 
Meanwhile, Pramono U. Tanthowi’s research about the application of shari’a 
bylaws in Cianjur (Daniels, 2009: 317­320) also vividly depicts discriminatory practices 
against non­Muslims. The enactment of shari’a bylaws in several cases has triggered 
prejudice and bitter conflict between religious communities. In fact, there are several 
incidents in which non­Muslims were forced to comply with one or more shari’a 
stipulations. For example, individuals including a post office employee, a teacher in a 
public school, and students of a state high school were forced to wear Muslim dress in 
the office each Friday. Ironically, shari’a bylaws in Cianjur are also often used by hard­
line Muslim groups to attack property owned by religious minorities. For example, in 
2001 hard­line Muslims indiscriminately attacked and demolished non­Muslim 
restaurants. In other cases, they also expelled several non­Muslim families by forcing 
them to go to other settlements (Tanthowi, 2009: 24­25). This calls into question claims 
from proponents of shari’a bylaws about their respect toward religious minorities. Such 
claims can in fact be seen as little more than political promises, aimed at convincing 
other groups to believe their agenda without any serious effort at implementation. 
It is important to note that discrimination and violations of the rights of religious 
minorities not only take place in non­Muslim groups, but they also violate the civil 
liberties of Muslim groups. Such attacks usually target groups which are seen as 
deviant. Ahmadiyah is one example of an Islamic group which has suffered 
discrimination because its followers believe in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. 
According to a number of shari’a bylaws, Ahmadiyah damages Islam because it clearly 
follows the path and concept of apostasy (ridda). The status of apostasy in the shari’a 
context not only applies to people who convert from Islam to another religion, but also 
for people whose and practices deviate from mainstream Islam (Kamil, 2009: 142­143). 
Certainly, this concept is seen as legitimate by a majority of people who live in regions 
in which shari’a bylaws are implemented. As a result, Ahmadis can be seen as having 
been victimised by some Muslim groups. Ahmadiyah members also are often expelled 
from their houses and forced to move to other regions.  
Another impact of shari’a bylaws on religious minorities is that many of them 
face difficulties in building places of worship. For example, although non­Muslims in 
Cianjur have followed all procedures and fulfilled all requirements to obtain approval to 
build a place of worship, some Muslim groups remain opposed to their proposal. 
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Similarly, this has also occurred at the national level, as evidenced by the growing 
numbers of churches and church institutions which have been destroyed by hard­line 
Muslims (Tanthowi, 2009: 25). Interestingly, CRCS UIN Jakarta’s research (Kamil et 
al., 2007: 190­194) has confirmed that in areas where shari’a bylaws apply, non­
Muslims often experience damage to their place of worship. Minority Christian groups 
are forbidden to worship or hear mass in their own homes. This research also reveals 
that 74 % respondents from non­Muslim groups stated they have experienced 
difficulties in worshipping. It can be said that shari’a bylaws promote intolerance and 
discrimination against the rights of worship of other groups.  
Instead of protecting the rights of religious minorities, some regional 
governments in Indonesia support discrimination and intolerance toward non­Muslims. 
This fact can be seen from the organisational structure in the Religious Department of 
Cianjur. The Department of Religion in Indonesia was actually created to deal with 
religious affairs to all religions. As a result, all religious groups should be represented. 
Nevertheless, there is no office or officials in charge of non­Muslim services in the 
Religious Department in Cianjur. Non­Muslims have to go the Provincial Religious 
Department in Bandung if they encounter problems relating to their religious (Tanthowi, 
2009: 27­28). Ironically, this discrimination is not only in terms of service, but also in 
budgeting matters. Hence, entire budgets are allocated exclusively for Muslims and 
religious minorities do not receive anything from the Department. This situation 
certainly contradicts the Indonesian constitution which requires neutrality in dealing 
with all religions. 
Shari’a bylaws in many regions have undermined the civil rights of religious 
minorities. It has been argued from the CRCS UIN Jakarta’s research that many non 
Muslims experience difficulties in becoming civil servants (29.5 %), receiving subsidies 
from local governments (12 %), and opening places of business during Ramadan (13 
%). Besides that, some groups have also encountered obstacles in becoming leaders 
because they are non­Muslims (Kamil et al., 2007: 201­203). Opportunities to become a 
civil servant are most often accorded to the majority. It is not surprising, because under 
Islamic rule, non­Muslims cannot be appointed as caliph or president. Shari’a bylaws 
also create a paradigm in which non­Muslims’ leadership skills and other qualities are 
seen as inferior to Muslims. Proponents of shari’a bylaws believe that non­Muslims’ 
status under shari’a can be understood by looking the concept of dhimmi (non­Muslims 
under Muslim rule). According to this concept, non­Muslims are allowed to live under 
Islamic rule and Muslims should regard them religious. Yet, non­Muslims have to obey 
Islamic law. They also have to pay jizya (a form of poll tax) to guarantee their loyalty 
towards the country and the Islamic government protecting their security (Hosen, 2005: 
435).  
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However, the concept of dhimmi (non­Muslims under Muslim rule) has actually 
been criticized by Islamic scholars. For example, Abdullahi Ahmed an­Na’im argued 
that shari’a in the modern era is in fact incompatible with international relations and 
human rights (An­Na’im, 1987: 1­18). According to him, shari’a’s rigid categorization 
of territories (dar al-islam (Islamic territories) and dar al-harb (non­Islamic territories) 
and people (Muslims and dhimmi (non­Muslims)) is morally untenable and practically 
unfeasible in the contemporary world. And from non­Muslims’ point of view, they tend 
to stress that under the term of dhimmi, they would be second­class citizens. Indeed, 
non­Muslims are afraid that concept of dhimmi would be applied to them in the future 
(Hosen, 2007: 209). Since the rights of religious minorities are not protected by shari’a 
bylaws, the implementation of such laws often causes them to feel like outsiders or half 
citizens. They also feel that their religious liberties are being violated (Salim, 2007: 
131). If we refer to Indonesia’s Constitution, discrimination toward non­Muslims 
through the concept of dhimmi is inconsistent with the notion of equality before the law. 
Thus, the Indonesian government should protect religious minorities and reevaluate the 
existence of shari’a bylaws. 
To fully understand the implications of shari’a bylaws for religious minorities, it 
is important to consider the views of non­Muslims. As Bertholomeus Bolong (2006: 
154­156) has argued, the implementation of shari’a bylaws can be seen as a ‘soft’ 
approach to introducing Islamic law as the basis for the Indonesian state. Bolong also 
thinks that the enactment of shari’a bylaws in a plural and multicultural state like 
Indonesia will endanger national unity. In fact, the application of shari’a bylaws can 
trigger discrimination, intimidation, and force to obey the same regulations as Muslims 
which in contravention of human rights. This situation can also easily trigger religious 
conflict in Indonesia. Most Christians in regions where shari’a bylaws have been 
implemented have also stated that they feel oppressed by these laws. For example, a 
Christian in Padang has stated that shari’a bylaws tend to dismiss the existence of 
Christian communities and other religious communities outside Islam. In fact, the 
number of Christians in Padang is approximately 22.000 (Romli, 2008). Therefore, the 
enactment of shari’a bylaws in this area indirectly ignores a huge number of people who 
should have equal rights as Indonesia citizens.  
 
Some Suggestions for the Protection of Religious Minorities  
As demonstrated above, shari’a bylaws directly are contravene Pancasila (Five 
Principles/Indonesia’s official state ideology) and Indonesian’s Constitution. This is 
because from the beginning of Indonesian independence, Indonesia has adopted an 
ideology that expresses dedication to Unity in Diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) and 
religious pluralism. This ideology, known as Pancasila, does not accord preferential 
status to the majority (Eliraz, 2004: 78­79). As a means to fairly meet conflicting 
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demands, Indonesia is neither a religious nor secular state but a Pancasila state. And as 
stated in the Constitution (UUD 1945) Article 29 (1 and 2), “Indonesia is based on The 
One Mighty God”, and “the state guarantees the freedom of religion with the obligation 
to practice their respected religion”. The state recognises equality among citizens 
without looking at their religious, ethnic, and gender backgrounds (Hara, 2010: 39).  
As a consequence, the government must be responsible to protect religious 
minorities from discrimination by providing them with effective legal remedies. And 
this policy must be emphasized firmly in the constitution (Salim, 2007: 135). Because 
of the importance the rights of minorities, the state must evaluate all of the laws which 
contain discriminatory ideas such as shari’a bylaws. Besides that, the state must make 
sure that all of the regional regulations correspond with the principle of nationality, 
plurality, equality, tolerance, and justice. According to R.E. Elson (2010: 340), great 
political morality and will are required to make this a reality. This is likely to be 
challenging, however, given that politics often prioritises pragmatism over moral 
considerations.  
It is important to note that many shari’a bylaws reflect a narrow, text­based and 
traditional interpretation of shari’a. As a consequence, religious minorities and other 
Muslims groups which have different opinions from the hard­line Islamic groups often 
become the victims of the such an interpretation. Besides that, the formalisation of 
shari’a Islam through bylaws frequently only represents shari’a in name only, without 
applying shari’a’s substantive meaning. In fact, the substantive meaning of shari’a Islam 
is to encourage peace, justice, humanity, wisdom, and prosperity (Wahid, 2006). As 
Nadirsyah Hosen (2007: 233) has noted, under the substantive shari’a approach, the 
flexibility of Islamic law is assured and citizens’ constitutional rights are guaranteed. 
Therefore, Muslims should consider the substantive approach to shari’a and show that 
shari’a does not necessarily cause political chaos or inflict harm upon religious 
minorities and society.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has discussed shari’a bylaws in Indonesia and their implications for 
religious minorities. It has suggested that shari’a bylaws represent an old agenda which 
emerged again during the regional autonomy era. The regional autonomy agenda which 
was intended to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of bureaucracy has often been 
misused by local leaders to create shari’a bylaws. This is because many local leaders 
saw shari’ah bylaws as an opportunity to strengthen their power by appearing to favor 
Islamic interests. The enactment of shari’a bylaws is also the represents a renewed 
attempt by advocates of shari’a Islam to introduce shari’a by stealth at the regional 
level, after their failure to do so through open democratic processes at the national level. 
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Besides that, Aceh’s success in implementing shari’a bylaws also triggered greater 
interest in shari’ah bylaws in other regions. 
The introduction of such bylaws has many negative implications for religious 
minorities in Indonesia. This is because many of them are forced to observe the same 
regulations as Muslims. Shari’a bylaws have also caused discrimination against 
religious minorities. In many regions in which shari’a bylaws have been implemented, 
religious minorities have lost their right to religious freedom, the right to worship, the 
right to live, and the right to lead. Indeed, the status of non­Muslims under shari’a 
bylaws can potentially place them as the second­class citizens. In order to stop the 
negative implications of shari’a bylaws, the Indonesian government should protect 
religious minority rights through the Constitution which must be obeyed by all 
Indonesians. At the same time, Muslims should also consider the true meaning and 
substance of shari’a, rather than focusing on formal implementation only.  
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